Introduction
unions had shackled the industry with make-work rules and jurisdictional distinctions even more preposterous, perhaps, than the restrictions that have all but ruined the railroads. The conventional view of union work rules in construction stated above is that they result in excessive manning and technological stagnation. This view largely originates from journalistic accounts of such horror stories as the journeyman assigned to operate an automatic elevator and the master mechanic who earned $90,000 one year without touching his wrench. Many nonacademic studies of the issue, frequently funded by business groups, reinforce this view. For instance, the Business Roundtable (BR) recently conducted a major study of construction industry productivity. The overall tone of their report was described in these terms by the Wall Street Journal, "Although the Roundtable spreads blame for the productivity problem widely, it clearly thinks the principal culprit is organized labor."1 This is difficult to reconcile with the results of academic research designed to measure the impact of work rules on factor allocation. Surveys of actual work practices in the 1950s and 1970s concluded the impact of union work rules on efficiency had been vastly overestimated in popular accounts. This is consistent with the conclusions of my quantitative estimates of productivity differences between union and nonunion contractors in Mlen (1983, l984a) .
Although these estimates did not consider work rules explicitly, it is difficult to reconcile my findings of generally higher productivity in union construction with highly restrictive work practices. This paper directly estimates the impact of union work rules in construction by comparing factor demand elasticities for union and nonunion contractors. The hypothesis that work rules produce lower demand elasticities in the union sector was proposed by Freeman and Medoff. Union work rules either specify situations in which certain inputs cannot be used (occupational jurisdictions, restrictions on subcontracting, prefabrication, or certain types of equipment) or restrict the quantity of inputs (foremen or apprentice ratios, minimum crew sizes). In either case managers have less flexibility to select the least-cost combination of inputs. As a result, union contractors cannot adjust input quantities to a given differential in input prices as much as nonunion contractors, resulting in lower own-price elasticities and elasticities of substitution under unionism. Freeman and Medoff call this the relative inelasticity hypothesis.2
This study focuses on contractor behavior in samples of micro data in commercial office building and elementary and secondary school construction.
These data sets are especially well-suited for testing the relative inelasticity hypothesis because the product and the technology are identical within each sample.
This was not the case for the two-digit manufacturing industry data used by Freeman and Medoff. As a result they could not reject the possibility that their finding of lower demand elasticities under unionism was attributable to decisions by unions to organize sectors within each two-digit industry that had the lowest factor demand elasticities (so as to minimize the adverse employment effects of higher wages), rather than to the impact of union work rules. Since contractors are price takers in local labor markets, this study also avoids the simultaneity between price and quantity determination involved with most studies of factor demand elasticities.
The focus here is solely upon factor misallocation resulting from union work rules, as opposed to that resulting from union-nonunion wage gaps. The latter issue cannot be addressed without carefully standardizing for labor quality differences between union and nonunion labor. Such standardization is not necessary for this study. Even though my earlier studies show more labor services are embodied in an hour of union labor, this will not bias the elasticity estimates. Although the union contractors would make smaller adjustments in the number of hours for a given type of labor in response to a difference in relative prices, the percentage adjustment in hours relative to the percentage adjustment in prices would not be affected by this consideration.
This study also reports direct evidence on the effect of union work rules involving prefabrication. General contractors in a survey of hospitals and nursing homes were asked whether 15 different types of prefabricated components were used.
The possible restrictive impact of unionism is gauged by comparing the questionnaire responses of union and nonunion contractors and by estimating prefabrication probability equations relating the usage of prefabricated components to unionism, wage rates, size and type of building, and other control variables. This paper is organized in the following fashion. Section II reviews the literature on restrictive union work practices in construction. Section III describes the procedures used to estimate factor demand elasticities; Section IV, the data.
I initially assume labor inputs are separable from capital and materials and present results on aggregated labor, capital, and materials in Section V.
Differences in demand elasticities by union status for skilled labor, supervisory labor, and unskilled labor are reported in Section VI. The separability restrictions are tested in Section VII and results from models without those restrictions are discussed. Section VIII contains a simulation of the effect of union work rules as manifested by differences in factor demand elasticities on factor demand, costs, and productivity. Union-nonunion differences in prefabrication are examined in Section IX. The results are summarized and evaluated in Section X.
II. Previous Research
Two approaches have been used in previous studies to determine the effect of i n 4 on ,.,n v-I, v-I i 1 at on P r +0?' 1 1 or 4-4 on 4 n f-ha ron e + v-i r 4-4 an 4 A1iv+y'.,
first approach union contracts are examined to see if they contain restrictive language. This method can produce misleading conclusions because management and the union may agree to ignore the contract provisions. Even if the contract is followed, the restrictions need not be costly. On large jobs, minimum crew size provisions are not going to be binding constraints. In some cases excess labor can be used outside craft lines. On the other hand, restrictive practices may be followed at the work site even though they are not required by the contract.
The second approach is to interview union officials, union and open-shop contractors, and construction owners to determine which practices are actually being followed. This allows the researcher to determine whether the work rules in the contract are actually costly and whether practices not mentioned in the contract are imposing additional constraints. Both approaches are limited in one key respect--ad hoc assumptions about staffing requirements and factor demand elasticities have to be made to determine the quantitative impact of these provisions.
The most comprehensive study of contract provisions is the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) examination of 769 agreements for 16 building trades unions in the 66 largest SMSAs in 1972-73. The percentage of workers covered by each of nine productivity-related contract provisions is reported for each of ten major unions and for all 16 unions together in Table 1 . Minimum crew size provisions and requirements for a foreman after a given number of workers are hired are the most widespread practices with potentially adverse effects on productivity. Crew size restrictions cover over one-third of all workers and over two-thirds of bricklayers, ironworkers, electrical workers, and operating engineers. This could reduce the own-price elasticity of skilled labor and the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and other inputs on small jobs.
About 60 percent of the contracts require foremen after so many workers are hired, with over half of these requiring a foreman after one to three workers.
This could reduce the own-price elasticity of supervisory labor and the elasticity of substitution between supervisors and other types of labor on small jobs. In addition, 26.5 percent of the contracts contain foreman-to-journeyman ratios, which could reduce this elasticity for jobs in all size categories.
Considerably less widespread are 'provisions limiting prefabrication, tools and equipment, the ability of employers (usually subcontractors) to work with tools, and the use of non-bargaining unit personnel. These provisios are clustered within a few trades. Prefabrication limits cover 70 percent of the plumbers and 77 percent of the sheet metal workers. Limits on tools cover 83 percent of the painters (maximum brush size). Restrictions on the use of tools by employers are most often found in the contracts of painters, plumbers, and electrical workers. Three-fourths of the sheet metal workers are covered by contracts restricting the use of non-bargaining unit personnel. Nearly half of the workers in this samole are covered by contracts that bar limitations on the What are the common themes in all of these findings? First, despite popular conceptions, most union contracts are not riddled with provisions that seriously interfere with factor allocation. Second, the interview studies indicate many rules look more restrictive on paper than they are in practice because either they do not generally impose binding constraints or they are not followed. Third, although most trades seem relatively free of restrictive work practices, certain problem areas keep popping up in almost all of the studies summarized above.
These include limits on prefabrication in plumbing and sheet metal work, limits on tools and equipment in painting, crew size limits among ironworkers and operating engineers, and restrictions on the use of tools by employers in electrical work. Fourth, the two most recent studies both concluded the major work rule problem facing employers today was the exclusive jurisdiction system. Contractors strongly believed they could significantly reduce manhour requirements if they could assign workers to tasks outside their craft's jurisdiction and make greater use of semiskilled and unskilled labor.
III. Specification
Estimates of union and nonunion factor demand elasticities are obtained from The partial derivatives of (1) with respect to factor prices are the demand equations for each factor, that is C/aP = Xi. In logarithms this becomes by alnC/alnP. = rn = Si, where S. = share of factor i in total cost. In the translog case,
Since both the cost function and the share equations contain information about the parameters of interest, they are jointly estimated below by iterated seemingly unrelated regression. One share equation is dropped to make the covariance matrix of the disturbances nonsingular. This produces maximum likelihood estimates that are invariant to the choice of which share equation is dropped.
Elasticities of substitution (an) and own-price demand elasticities are computed from the estimates of (1) and (2) using the formulae
With (1) and (2) One limitation of this procedure is that it assumes that factor quantities are selected at points on the contractor's demand curve. In practice some union work rules specify factor quantities well to the right of the demand curve (e.g. minimum crew size restrictions), which means the isoquants of union contractors (as constrained by the work rules) contain flat segments and discontinujtjes, especially at small levels of output. By assuming normally distributed errors in the share equations, the model will be misspecified to some extent for the union contractors. The true union elasticities will be zero at some points, whereas the model will impose a smooth, continuous structure on the isoquants. Standard errors will be biased upwardly in the union sample.
In spite of the limitations of the translog specification, the model can approximate the curvature of isoquants under unionism and these results can be compared to the curvature of nonunion isoquants in order to get at the fundamental question of how much do union work rules matter in determining factor quantities.
IV. Data Each contractor reports the amount of the contract, union status, type and cost of each material item, fair rental value or depreciation for each type of equipment, and hours and wages for each occupation employed onsite.
Since the focus here is on substitution patterns for onsite inputs, interest expenses are not included in capital costs. The cost measure used below is total labor, material, and equipment costs in the KLM model; total labor costs, in the BSU model . The contract amount is used as the output measure in both models.
Materials prices are not reported and must be constructed from other sources. To impute capital prices in those cases, the rnean-cost-.to-hours ratio for the contractor's operation code (e.g., plumbing, carpentry, excavation, etc.)
is used.
Factor prices also had to be imputed for occupational groups when they were not used on a particular project. These were obtained from the coefficients of an average hourly earnings equation estimated over each occupational group used by each contractor with separate intercepts for each building, each occupational group, and complete occupation-union interactions. The dependant variable was specified in linear form. The results, reported in Table 2, are generally consistent with what is known about the wage structure in the industry.
Apprentices and unskilled workers earn about the same amount within each sector.
Both qoups earn less than skilled workers, who in turn earn less than supervisors. The union-nonunion wage gap is largest in percentage terms for the least skilled occupations.
V. KLM Model Results
The shares of labor, materials, and capital for all samples are reported in the first three lines of share is slightly lower.
Equality of the translog cost system parameters for union and nonunion contractors is strongly rejected in both office building and school construction.
The test of equal union and nonunion coefficients involves 10 restrictions.
The critical chi-square value at the 99. The translog coefficients show the production function for subcontractors in school and office building construction to be nonhomothetic and, in all but one case, constant returns to scale. Labor and capital shares shrink with output in both samples, with greater shrinkage among nonunion contractors.
Materials share is greater in large projects, once again with a larger rate of increase with respect to project size in the nonunion sector. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale can be rejected only for union school subcontractors.
They are subject to increasing (decreasing) returns for projects with value added of more (less) than $9451. These results are somewhat different from those I obtained in Allen (1984b) in which the unit of observation was theentjre building project rather than individual contractors. This need not reflect aggregation bias in the earlier paper since general and miscellaneous contractors are omitted here. The two exercises are also conceptually different, as the results in the other paper reflect not only the behavior of subcontractors but also the coordination of many types of work going on at once.
Even though pooling by union status is rejected, the estimates of factor demand elasticities for labor, materials, and capital in Table 4 show no particular pattern for union as opposed to nonunion contractors. In both samples, there is little difference in the own price elasticity for labor by union status, with all of the estimates falling between .51 and .66. The own price elasticity for capital is somewhat larger for union contractors in both samples, and the own price elasticity for materials is slightly larger for nonunion contractors in the school sample, but the differences are not statistically significant.
The elasticity of substitution estimates show labor and materials to be substitutes in construction, as are materials and capital. Labor and capital are complements for both union and nonunion contractors in office building construction and for nonunion contractors in school construction. In union school construction, labor and capital are substitutes. Out of the four cases where factor pairs are substitutes for both union and nonunion contractors, the nonunion elasticity is larger in three cases, but the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of them.
A serio.s potential source of bias in the office building sample is measurement error in the capital price proxy variable. The estimates are much smaller for that sample, whereas the standard errors for all parameters more difficult to estimate accurately union-nonunion differences.
One way to roughly assess this bias is to re-estimate the model over the school sample using the capital price proxy in place of the correct measure.
The following elasticity estimates were obtained for the pooled sample:
Own-price Union- The own price elasticity for capital is much larger in absolute value in this specification, as the estimate falls from .025 to -.017. The elasticities of substitution between capital and both labor and materials bear little resemblance to the earlier estimates. This casts some doubt about the findings of complementarity between labor and capital and a large materials-capital elasticity in the office building sample.
Measurement error seems to have little effect on the finding of no difference in elasticities by union status. All of the nonunion elasticities are larger (but not significantly) than the union elasticities in this case, in contrast to only three out of six in Table 4 . This suggests that if there is a bias in the office building estimates of union-nonunion differences, it is in favor of the relative inelasticity hypothesis.
In summary, there is no support for the hypothesis of lower factor demand elasticities for union contractors in the KLM model. This is consistent with the results of earlier academic studies. It also is consistent with the data on contract provisions showing limits on prefabrication or on tools and equipment to be relatively rare. This still leaves open the possibility of union work rules restricting the quantity or even the types of labor that can be hired, a matter that will now be examined.
VI. BSU Model Results
The allocation of different types of labor varies substantially by union status. As shown in the first three lines of Table 5 , the share of skilled labor is substantially higher for union contractors. In the school sample, skilled labor's share is 85 percent for union contractors versus 74 percent for nonunion contractors. Skilled labor's share is 80 percent for union contractors in the office building sample as opposed to 71 percent for nonunion contractors. These differences may reflect lower prices for skilled relative to unskilled labor under unionism or jurisdictional rules keeping unskilled workers out of certain tasks. Supervisory labor's share is slightly higher for union contractors in both samples. This may result from minimum foreman requirements or the relatively small difference between the wages of supervisory and other types of labor.
Unskilled labor's share is much smaller for union contractors in both samples. Once again, equality of all ten union and nonunion coefficients is rejected at extremely high confidence levels for the translog cost system. When the cost function was deleted from the system and the hypothesis retested with seven restrictions, pooling was still soundly rejected.8
The production function is nonhomothetic in all samples. The share of supervisory labor increases with output in all cases. The share of skilled labor falls with output for union contractors, but rises for nonunion contractors. The share of unskilled labor falls with output in the nonunion samples, but changes very little with output in the union samples.
How do own price elasticities for different types of labor and patterns of labor-labor substitution differ between union and nonunion contractors?
These results, reported in Table 6 , provide very strong support for the hypothesis that union work rules reduce management's flexibility to assign workers to jobs in the most efficient fashion. In five out of six cases, the own price elasticities are larger for nonunion contractors and in three such cases the differences are statistically significant from zero at a 90 percent or greater confidence level.
The estimated differences are especially pronounced in the case of skilled labor, as one would expect if occupational jurisdictions are the major restrictive aspect of union work rules. In both samples this elasticity is more than twice as large for nonunion contractors. In the school sample the elasticity for skilled labor is -.15 for union contractors as opposed to -.38 for nonunion contractors. The magnitudes of the estimates in the office building sample are quite similar: -.17 for union contractors and -.46 for nonunion contractors.
The magnitudes of the union-nonunion differences in the own price elasticity for unskilled labor are also quite large. This elasticity is -.44 for union Although the estimated standard errors for the union-nonunion difference are not small enough to reject the null hypothesis, the consistency of these results from two different samples is striking.
The results for supervisory labor in the office building sample are also consistent with the relative inelasticity hypothesis. The demand curve for supervisory labor in the union sector is practically vertical, perhaps reflecting foreman requirement rules. In contrast the demand elasticity is about -2.7
for nonunion contractors in this sample. Although this difference is significantly different from zero, it is difficult to reconcile with the results from the school sample in which the union elasticity is -2.1 . The nonunion elasticity is positive, but estimated with very little precision.
Elasticities of substitution also generally tend to be smaller in the union sector. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is near 1.6 for nonunion contractors in both samples. In contrast, this elasticity for union contractors in the school sample is 0.6; in the office building sample, 1.1. However, the hypothesis of no difference in the estimates in the office building sample cannot be rejected. This is also the case for the supervisory-unskilled elasticity in that sample.
The two samples produced conflicting results for substitution between skilled and supervisory workers. In the office building sample the union elasticity is negative (but not significantly different from zero), whereas the nonunion elasticity is 1.7. In contrast, the union elasticity in the school sample is 2.8, whereas the nonunion elasticity was negative. Weak separability is strongly rejected for office buildings but cannot be rejected for schools. This suggests the LKM model produces misleading estimates of the elasticities of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs for office buildings.
Other elasticity estimates may also be biased by the homogeneity restrictions.
The alternative procedure of estimating a five-factor translog cost system has an equally serious limitation. The data may simply not be up to the task of estimating three different elasticities of substitution between labor and capital and three more for labor and materials, especially with measurement error in the prices of capital and materials.
With this proviso in mind, turn now to the elasticity estimates in Table 7 .
The five-factor model results for office buildings are similar to those obtained in the previous section. Once again, labor demand elasticities are much lower for union contractors. In fact, the gap between union and nonunion elasticities is somewhat larger in the five-factor model, especially for the own price elasticities of supervisory and unskilled labor and all of the substitution elasticities between different types of labor. The absolute value of all nonunion elasticities involving supervisory labor is much larger in the five-factor model. Some are so large, especially the elasticity of substitution between supervisory and unskilled labor, that they cast doubt upon all the nonunion elasticity estimates.
One important difference between the five-factor and BSU model results is that all three types of labor are complements in the union sector. This suggests that jurisdictional rules allow little substitution among different types of labor.
Each type of labor is substitutable for materials and two are substitutable for capital, results roughly consistent with the KLM model estimates. Once again, capital and materials elasticities do not differ by union status.
The rejection of separability implies the elasticities of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs should vary for different types of labor.
Recall in Table 4 that the elasticity of substitution between labor and materials for the pooled sample was 1.1. In Table 6 the elasticity between materials and skilled labor is 0.7; between materials and supervisory labor, 8.0; between materials and unskilled labor, 1.8. The larger elasticity estimate for unskilled labor is consistent with the notion of greater economies of prefabrication for simple, repetitive tasks. I have no explanation for the extremely large elasticity estimate for supervisory labor.
The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital for the pooled sample is -1.8. In the case of skilled labor, this elasticity is 0.4; supervisory labor, -75.9; unskilled labor, 1.1. Once again, the relative magnitude of the skilled and unskilled elasticities makes some sense, indicating construction equipment is considerably less substitutable for the former. Apparently the complementarity between supervisory labor and capital is so large that it makes the aggregate labor elasticity somewhat misleading. The magnitude of the supervisory labor elasticity at mean factor share values seems too large to take seriously. When supervisory labor and capital's share are each 10 percent, this elasticity becomes -4.2.
Even though the separability restrictions for schools cannot be rejected, the five-factor model was also estimated over that sample to determine the sensitivity of those results to an alternative specification. A larger nonunion elasticity for unskilled labor and elasticity of substitution beten skilled and unskilled labor are the only results at all consistent with the BSU and KLM models. The supervisory labor elasticity estimates are more peculiar here than in Table 6 , casting considerable doubt upon the reasonableness of the other elasticities. Since the separability restrictions cannot be rejected for schools, I don't believe the five-factor model results merit serious consideration in this case.
Because of the peculiar values of the elasticities for supervisory labor, a four-factor model in which skilled and supervisory labor were aggregated and examined along with unskilled labor, materials and capital was also estimated.
Weak separability of skilled and supervisory labor was strongly rejected for the office building sample (-2nA = 46.2) but could not be rejected for schools (-2nx = 3.6). The results are fairly similar to those in Table 7 and are reported in Appendix Table A . Weak separability of the skilled-supervisory aggregate and unskilled labor from capital and materials was rejected at about the 90 percent confidence level for both samples (-2znx = 4.9 for offices and 4.5 for schools).
VIII. The Cost of Union Work Rules
The above results show own-price elasticities for labor and labor-labor substitution elasticities to be much lower for union contractors. How much of an effect do lower elasticities have on employment patterns, costs and productivity? To illustrate the magnitude of these adjustments, the change in factor allocation in the union sector resulting when wages fall to nonunion levels is simulated, using both union and nonunion elasticities. The quality of union labor available at union wage rates is assumed to be identical to that available at nonunion rates. This allows the results of the simulation using union Another way of interpreting these results is that unions are willing to give up 5 percent of their wages in return for a 3 percent increase in staffing.
IX. Unions and Prefabrication
The effect of unions on the use of prefabricated components has already been addressed indirectly in the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between labor and materials reported above. This is far from an ideal test of the hypothesis that union work rules restrict the amount of prefabrication, as There is very little difference in the usage of prefabricated components between union and nonunion contractors, as reported in Table 9 . In eight of the 15 cases, union contractors are more likely to use the prefabricated component.
Recall that, according to BLS, contractual limits on prefabrication are most widespread for sheet metal workers. Despite these limits, about half of the union contractors used prefabricated air handling ducts and air conditioning equipment and union contractors were more likely than nonunion contractors to use prefabricated underfloor ducts. Thus, there seems to be, even in the case where contractual language is most restrictive, little union impact on prefabrication.
Another way to examine this question is to use probit equations to estimate the effect of unions on the probability that a particular type of prefabricated component is used. This allows the impact of exogenous variables that may be correlated with union status to be held constant. These variables include average hourly earnings, square footage of the building (both in logs), and binary variables indicating region (3), location in an SMSA, whether the building is an addition to an existing structure, whether the building is a nursing home, and whether the building is owned by a government or public agency. The union coefficients for each of these 15 equations are reported in the last In summary, the direct evidence on prefabrication is fully consistent with the indirect evidence on elasticities of substitution between labor and materials.
Both sets of evidence indicate no restrictive impact of union work rules on the choice of materials or the usage of prefabricated components.
IX. Conclusion
There are five major empirical results in this paper:
(1) The elasticities of substitution among different skill categories of labor and the own-price elasticities for each category are much lower in union than in nonunion construction.
(2) The elasticities of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs and own-price elasticities for nonlabor inputs are about the same in union and nonunion construction. Despite these appealing consistencies, these conclusions are subject to two general classes of criticisms. First, the results rely heavily on a particular functional form, the translog. These same issues were also explored with a more restrictive econometric approach, the relative factor input form of the CES.
The results, available upon request, showed lower union elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor but higher union elasticities of substitution between labor and capital for both office buildings and schools.
Clearly, work with less restrictive functional forms such as the generalized Box-Cox or the Fourier may yield different results. The frontier cost function approach is also applicable to union-nonunion elasticity comparisons (if you are willing to believe there is no such thing as good luck in construction).
Second, this paper shows some union demand elasticities to be lower and attributed this to union work rules. Since I have not produced an eyewitness account or ballistics evidence, this boils down to guilt by association. One way of 'proving union work rules cause lower elasticities is to compare elasticities across different types of contractors and then see if the patterns match up with those one would expect from the BLS contract provisions data (e.g., lower sustitutability between labor and materials in plumbing and sheet metal work). When I tried this with both translog and CES specifications, I found most of the results to be inconsistent with production theory, presumably because the data were being asked to do too much. Another appropriate procedure would be to estimate elasticities on union work covered by project agreements (which usually waive most restrictive work rules) and compare them to those for similar work where the work rules are followed, but no such data are currently available. 3Attempts to estimate separate union and nonunion elasticities for particular types of work (e.g., plumbing) were made, but the coefficients were either inconsistent with production theory (e.g., upward-sloping demand curves, all inputs complementary to each other) or much smaller than their standard errors.
4For an overview of the results of the entire BR construction productivity project, see BR (1983) . 58R (l982a) also dealt with provisions that increase labor costs such as overtime premiums, pay for time not worked, subsistence and travel pay, and shift premiums. The effect of such rules cannot be examined here directly because labor costs are not broken down in any detail. Although these provisions raise the price of labor, they do not generally prevent contractors from making adjustments in factor mixes to avoid such premiums and should have little or no effect on demand elasticities.
6Even if an output measure were available, the factor demand decisions of general contractors are not really comparable to those of subcontractors, as 45 one of their major functions is coordination of the entire project. This is reflected in a larger share of supervisory and administrative labor for general contractors. In the office building sample, seven general contractors hired only supervisory and administrative labor, and for 26 others this type of labor accounted for more than 20 percent of their labor costs.
7All of the models were also estimated over individual contractors with positive labor costs. These completely disaggregated estimates are very similar to those reported below and are available upon request.
8The values of -2nA are 38.7 for office buildings and 56.7 for schools.
Pooling of union and nonunion contractors can be rejected at the 99 percent confidence level in both cases. 
